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1.0 INTRODUCTION
A current spacecraft hardware program at the Johns Hopkins Applied
Physics Laboratory requires an ii00 ampere-hour, 250 pound battery. This
requirement can only be satisfied by a lithium chemistry battery. Several
lithium chemistry systems were investigated with 'several manufacturers. A
lithium thionyl chloride (Li/SOCI 2) F-size cell was selected.
To assess the safety hazard associated with a battery composed of
eight (8) modules each containing 72 F-sized cells, a fault tree analysis was
required by the program. Previous experience with lithium chemistry batteries
in the ALDOT (Air Launched Deep Ocean Transponder) and SARSAT ground
transmitter (Search And Rescue Satellite) programs enabled us to carry out
such an analysis efficiently. Much of the initial safety hazard assessment
for a single lithium chemistry cell was summarized in an internal APL report
available for government agency distribution only: "ALDOT Systems Safety
Analysis and the Li/SO 2 Battery," by O. M. Uy and R. H. Maurer, g.PL Report SOR
84084, August 1984.
This current report presents the results of the safety fault tree
analysis on the eight module, 576 F cell Li/SOCI 2 battery on the spacecraft
and in the integration and test environment prlor to launch on the ground.
2.0 ELECTROCHEMISTRY REQUIREMENTS
The battery requirement of the satellite is for a total capacity of
ii00 ampere-hours at a nominal 30 volts at 21°C and for a battery weight of
less than 250 Ibs. Figures 1-3 show the electrical and mechanical
configuration of the battery. This translates to a specific energy density of
at least 132 watt-hr/ib. A previous vendor survey for a battery requiring
only 750 ampere-hours resulted in proposals which would have utilized
Li/SOCI., Li/SO^, Li/CF and Zn/AgO cells, with only Li/SOCI 2 complying with
the energy denslty requlrement. When the battery capacity requirement was
subsequently increased from 750 to ii00 ampere-hours, the cells considered
were the Li/SOCI 2 and Li/SO2CI 2. Lithium sulfuryl chloride was quickly
abandoned however, because _t zs not as well developed as Li/SOCI 2. Thus the
electrochemical cells chosen in this program were _he F-sized Li/SOCl 2 ceils.
3.0
_UALITY ASSURANCE CONSIDERATIONS
In the fault tree analysis discussed later in this paper, it is shown
that manufacturing defects such as internal mechanical shorts between anode
and cathode or low cell capacities due to improper fill or failure of
hermeticity and current leakage due to lithium diffusion through the ceramic
insulator can lead to a decrease in the reliability of the battery and an
increase in risk with respect to safety. It was therefore decided that a
rigorous quality assurance procedure must be implemented with the cell
manufacturer, with proper controls for acceptance and qualification of cell
lots. We have chosen to incorporate the quality assurance documents from
NASA, 1'2 the U.S. Army 3 and Navy , and negotiated with the cell vendor in
order to come up with specific quality assurance procedures for the
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procurement of the battery, the flow-charts of which are shown in Figures
4-6. Even though these QA procedures are tailored to this program and this
vendor, APL will be procuring lithium battery systems with similar
specifications in the future.
4.0 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
Because of the high reliability and safety requirements of _he
program, the cells, as well as the electrical components used in the assembly
of the battery, are either space or military high reliability parts. For
example, the thermal fuses are 100% X-rayed and lot tested for thermal
performance. There are three thermal fuses per string so that every cell in
the battery is adjacent to a thermal fuse. Two blocking diodes are used in
series in order to preclude charging of a cell string in the event of a single
diode failure. The cells, modules and battery are subjected to random
vibration and thermal environments in order to screen out workmanship defects
such as weak solder or welding interconnections. Considerable attention is
paid to insure that the cells used in each string and module are manufactured
uniformly with respect to processes and materials. Finally, the sample cells
and batteries will be subjected to overdischarge, high-rate discharge, short-
circuit, heat-tape, capacity, vibration and thermal vacuum testing before the
flight and spare batteries will be accepted for shipment to APL.
5.0 DEVELOPMENT OF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
The safety fault tree for the battery module is shown in Figures 7
and 8. It has been developed applying the principles of s_fety fault tree
analysis published in the IEEE Transactions on Reliability _, the Journal of
the System Safety Society 6' and the Reliability Design Handbook 7.
In the fault tree the Top Event whose occurrence is potentially
catastrophic leading to mission failure is the explosion or structural
fragmentation of a battery module originated by the explosion of one or more
cells in the battery pack. A single cell explosion may lead to the Top Event
if the module container fails to operate as designed and relieve the
overpressure condition; thus, a primary explosion may cause the Top Event. In
addition, a single cell explosion may cause the Top Event to occur by creating
overpressure and overtemperature conditions inside the battery pack which
damage or make other neighboring batteries unstable leading to a second
sympathetic explosion of such speed (less than I00 milliseconds) and force
that not enough venting can occur soon enough even with the module vents
functioning as designed (see Figures 7 and 8).
Basic events which either initiate the Top Event or enable it to
occur are shown as ovals in the fault tree diagrams. AND gates in the tree
are marked with A; OR gates with O. Intermediate and Top Events are shown as
rectangles. Due to the size of the fault tree, it has been split into two
figures with the intermediate event, single cell explodes, common to each main
branch in Figures 7 and 8 and shown in detail in Figure 9. Figures 7 and 8
show that a single cell exploding and the failure of the module vents or a
single cell exploding and the modul--_-operating nominally but with a
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sympathetic secondary explosion occurring can lead to the Top Event. The
assumption that has been madein the analysis is that if a single cell
explodes_ a secondary explosion of greater magnitude due to a multiple battery
explosion will follow with somenon-zero probability -- here very
conservatively taken as a probability equal to i.
The basic events causing a single cell to explode are shownin Figure
9. Note that we have assumedthat it is muchmore likely for a single cell to
explode in the primary explosion scenario than for several to explode
simultaneously. Wewould expect that a two or three cell primary explosion
would occur with a frequency approximately equal to the square or cube
respectively of the single cell primary explosion probability. This low
probability multiple battery primary explosion is to be distinguished from a
multiple battery sympathetic secondary explosion which seemsto be of a fairly
high probability once the unstable conditions created by the primary explosion
of a single cell are in existence.
Figure 9 is the part of the fault tree showing the possible causes of
single cell explosion. The branch of the tree under battery charging leads
directly to an overpressure condition so quickly that the individual cell vent
cannot prevent explosion from occurring. This charging condition can occur if
a cell in a given string of cells, which is parallel with other strings of
cells in the module, has low capacity relative to the other cells in the
string and if the two diodes protecting the string both either fail shorted or
have been installed backwards in any combination of these two fault
conditions.
In order to makethe various conditions necessary for the single cell
explosion to occur more understandable we will list the ten minimumcut sets
(Table i) for all critical system states leading to the event "Single Cell
Explodes" in Figure 9. The first set will be for the battery charging
condition explained above.
The ten sets of basic events have been determined from literature
search and discussion with experts involved with the manufacture and use of
lithium batteries for both military and commercial applications. In order to
determine the relative importance of the various branches in the fault tree,
estimates must be madeof the probability of occurrence of all basic events
which are then propagated through the fault tree by addition at ORgates and
multiplication at ANDgates. These estimates and the rationale for their use
are the subject of the next section.
After the original fault tree to estimate the module failure in the
spacecraft had been developed, we also estimated the safety hazard incurred if
modules were stored for one month on the ground during integration (Figure
8). The presence of an SO2 detector lowers the risk of undetected cell or
module venting and the consequent release of toxic gases in the vicinity of
integration personnel to about one chance in I0,000.
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Table 1
Minimum Cut Sets for Critical System States
for the Event "Single Cell Explodes"
Cell Char_ing
Io
2.
3.
Cell Low and Diodes Installed Backwards
Cell Low and Diodes Fail Shorted
Cell Low and one Diode Fails and the other is installed
backwards
OvertemDerature
io High Ambient Temperature and Cell Vent Struck or Slow
Internal Short (leading to OvertemDerature)
Io
2.
3.
Seal Failure leading to shorting condition and Cell Vent
Stuck or Slow
Single Cell Shorted by external wire or conductive debris
and Cell Vent Stuck or Slow
Manufacturing Defects creating internal short and Cell Vent
Stuck or Slow
High Rate Discharge (leadin_ to Overtemperature)
le
o
Multi-cell Short due to external wire or debris and Thermal
Fuse shorted and Thermal Switch shorted and Cell Vent
Stuck or Slow
One or more cells shorted to ground and Fuse shorted and
Thermal Fuse Shorted and Thermal Switc--_ shorted and Cel---_
Vent Stuck or Slow
Forced Overdischar_e (the rate may not be very hish)
lo Cell within string with low capacity and Other cells in
string with normal capacity and Thermal Fuse shorted and
Thermal Switch shorted and Cell Vent Stuck or Slow
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6.0 PROBABILITIES OF FAULT TREE BASIC EVEl_S
The probabilities of the fault tree basic events for a single
spacecraft mission are shown in Table 2 together with comments about the
rationale behind the use of the numbers. Table 3 shows the probability of an
individual battery having a capacity which is 25% discharged.
It is readily seen that some of these basic event probabilities are
time dependent and that some (usually related to conditions existing at the
time of manufacture or to human factors) are independent of time. When the
probability of module failure in storage is estimated, all time dependent
basic event probabilities are multiplied by the number of hours in a month
(720) rather than the 168 hour value assumed for the duration of the
spacecraft mission.
The probability of failure for the diodes, gas sensors, relief valves
(vents) and fuses are calculated with models and data from MIL Handbook 217D
for the electronic parts 8 and the Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data 9 both
compiled by the Reliability Analysis Center of the Rome Air Development Center
at Griffiss Air Force Base in New York. Base failure rates are taken from
life test da_a and are usually given at a 60% confidence level from testing
involving i0_ component hours or more. These base failure rates are
subsequently derated for several factors among which are
a) the environment that the part will be used in; e.g., Airborne,
Uninhabited Transport
b) the quality level of the part, e.g. commercial or military_ and
the level of screening that has been applied in the part
selection
c) in some cases, the current rating of the device
d)
e)
the application of the device, e.g. analog circuit with less
than 500 mA operating current.
a stress factor usually calculated as a ratio of the applied
voltage or power =o the rated vol=age or power of the device
f) in some cases a construction factor_ e.g. hermetically sealed
or matallurgically bonded.
These numbers are generally given as failures per million hours of operation
which is easily transformed into a rate of failures per hour for a single
unit.
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Basic Event Probabilities for Single Module
Probability of Failure
2.73xi0 -I0 per hour
Diode install- 10-4 per diode
ed incorrect-
ly
Fuse or therm" 3.89xi0 -7
al fuse fails
short
Comment
MIL Handbook 217D 8
number times 168 hours
flight time squared for
two diodes per voltage
string
Aeroj?t General Human
Error TM Rates Table;
square of probability
for single string
Non-electronic parts 9
reliability data times
168 hours flight time
times one fuse
Battery cell
shorted to
ground
10-4 per cell Experience with welded
wire board shorts times
72 cells
Battery cells
shorted to-
gether
Single cell
internal
manufacturing
defects
10-4 per cell Experience with welded
wire boards times 288
possible pairs to short
together
Non-electronic parts 9
reliability data times
72 cells
Single cell
short due to
conductive
fragments
10-4 per cell Experience with welded
wire boards times 72
cells
Fault Tree Number
2.10x10 -15
10-8
6.54xi0 -5
7.2xi0 -3
2.88xi0 -2
5.04xi0 -3
7.2xi0 -3
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Table 2 (Continued)
Basic Event Probabilities for Single Module
Basic Event Probability of Failure
8. Internal short 1.83xi0 -6 per hour
due to seal
failure
9. High ambient Ixl0 -6
temperature
i0. Individual Ixl0 -5
cell vent
stuck or slow
Ii. Explosion for Ixl0 -6
unexplained
reasons
12. Module vents
clog
5x10 -6 per hour
13. SO 2 sensor
on ground
malfunctions
3.5xi0 -6
14. Thermal
switch fails
to open
10 -4 per hour
Comment
SANDIA data II on new
cell seal times 168
hours flight times
times 72 cells
Fault Tree Number
2.21xi0 -2
Temperature greater than ixl0 -6
100°C highly unlikely
in spacecraft or storage
ixl0 -5
ixl0 -6
Non-electronic parts
data 9 on relief
valve
An estimate
Non-electronic parts
data 9 on failure of
mechanical couplings or
springs times 168 hours
flight time squared for
two vents
Non-electronic parts 9
data on sensors in gen-
eral times 720 haurs
per month on ground
Non-electronic parts 9
data on thermal switches
times 168 hours flight
time
7.06xi0 -7
2.52x10-3/month
1.68xi0 -2
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Table 3
Probability of Low Cell Capacity
(25% Discharged)
Coefficient of Standardized
Variation, o/x Normal Variate,Z
Probability of Fault Tree Number
25% Discharge Cell Charging Forced Over-Discharge
0.09 2.78 2.7xi0 -3 0.194 0.151
MEAN-LOWER LIMIT X - LL
o
i) Calculate: Z = STANDARD DEVIATION
i LL'x/- 1-.75 .25
a/- _ oT-
X X X
2)
3)
4)
5)
Probability found assuming a normal distribution
72 cells in voltage strings for battery charging branch
56 cells in position for forced overdischarge branch of fault tree
Probability of other cells in string having nominal capacity (for forced
overdischarge)
Prob = p8 = (l_q)8 ffi0.979
where q is the probability of a single cell being 25% discharged
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When the mode of failure is also significant, data on the
distribution of failure modes has also been used. In assessing mission
reliability, whether a part fails electrically open or short may make no
difference since a subsystem will often fail to function in either case.
However, in assessing safety hazards it is often the case that only one
failure mode presents a threat. In the case of the battery module, diodes and
fuses must fail in a shorted condition for the various branches of the fault
tree to be able to initiate a catastrophe. For example, 90% of the time fuses
fail short or perform as if short because they are slow to open or exceed the
designed current rating.
As shown in Table 2 the values used for probability of failure are
multiplied by the number of hours, assumed to be 168 for the spacecraft
mission_ when they are time dependent and the number of parts when more than
one can be independently susceptible to failure at the same time. For the
storage case a separate table was not created but the numbers inserted into
the fault tree (see Figure 9) have been multiplied by 720 hours representing
one month of storage/integration time. Figures 10-13 show the numbers used in
the respective spacecraft and storage fault trees for basic events from Table
2 and for intermediate and top events as calculated by either multiplying (AND
gates) or adding (OR gates) as one proceeds up the branches of the fault tree
from the bottom.
Several more comments are necessary about the basic event
probabilities listed in Table 2. 'Mechanical basic event probabilities were
assigned from data on devices which were similar in function and operation.
The number on the individual cell vent being stuck or slow comes from data on
pressure relief valves but is not considered to be time dependent because of
the method of manufacture.
Probabilities for shorting to occur come from the authors' experience
with the fabrication of welded wire boards for space hardware and soldered
test boards for large designed reliability test programs.
Human factors probabilities are the most variable and the "softest"
numbers in the fault trees. Values pre_ented have been arrived at using the
Aerojet General Human Error Rates Table v for various common tasks plus
discussions with a safety expert at the Naval Safety Center in Norfolk,
Virginia 12.
Table 3 shows the probability of having an individual cell of low
capacity (ampere-hours) given the coefficient of variation (the ratio of the
standard deviation to the mean of the capacity for a set of samples) of the
cells as manufactured. Selection of the value 0.09 is the result of
discussions with the manufacturer. We defined battery low as being a 25%
discharged condition even though testing has most often concentrated on 50%
discharged cells. Thus, if the coefficient of variation of the lithium-
thionyl choloride cells is 0.09, a 25% discharge state is 2.78 standard
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deviations from the mean with a probability of occurrence of 2.7 x 10-3 .
last number comes from any table of probabilities for standardized normal
variates assuming a normal distribution for cell capacities.
This
The probability of an individual cell being 25% discharged (CELL LOW
in the fault trees) is then multiplied by the number of cells in the module
battery pack. Thus, "Fault Tree Numbers" presented in Table 3 are entered as
CELL LOW in calculating the frequency of occurrence of the Top Event of the
fault tree. In addition, (see Cell Char_ing branch) the probability for One
diode being incorrectly inst_lled is i0-_; for two to be simultaneously
incorrectly installed is I0-_. Actually, if one diode were inserted
backwards, the second one might also have a high probability of being inserted
in a like manner; however, a polarity check has been specified in the
fabrication process. The probability of this polarity check failing has been
judged to be the same order of magnitude as installing a diode backwards.
Thus, we maintain the i0 -_ value.
Some logic implicit in the fault trees will now be explained. Once
we have determined the probability for anyone of 72 independent cells having
low capacity or being shorted to ground or being internally shorted, we must
be careful not to overestimate the probability of protective devices such as
diodes, fuses or cell vents failing at the same time to enable the cell
failure to cause cell explosion. That is, any of 72 cells can have low
capacity or be internally shorted which is why the single cell probabilities
are multiplied by 72 in some cases in Table i. However, once a single battery
cell has low capacity or is internally shorted, it is only the vent for that
cell or the diodes for that cell's string or the fuse associated with that
cell that can simultaneously fail enabling single cell explosion to occur.
The failure of other vents, diodes, fuses, etc. not associated with the cell
in question would not enable the top event of single cell explosion to
occur. Therefore, the probabilities of failure for protective devices such as
diodes, fuses, cell vents, etc. are not multiplied by the total number of such
components in the battery module (see Table 2).
Table 3 also contains a column showing values for the Forced
Overdischarge branch of the fault trees. For this phenomena cells at the end
of strings are not included because voltage reversal cannot occur unless both
cell terminals are connected to neighboring cells in a series circuit. Only
the seven interior cells in the voltage strings - a total of 56 cells - can
experience this failure mode. Together with a single cell having low
capacity, the remaining cells in the same string must have nominal
capacities. The probability for nominal cell capacity in this case is p8 =
(l-q) 8 where q is the probability of one interior cell having low capacity.
In Table 2 the probability of f_ilure from an Internal Short due to
cell Seal Failure is given as 1.83 x I0- per hour, which, when multiplied by
the 168 hour flight time in the spacecraft and 72 cells in the battery pack
yields 2.21 x 10 -2 for the spacecraft fault tree (see Figure 12). For the
storage fault tree (see Figure 13), however, we do no____tmultiply by the 720
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hours in a month. The shorting due to seal failure is a self-limiting process
in that as a crack in the seal becomes larger with time, there is less
capacity in the cell to supply the greater current that can now flow. The
Seal Failure Internal Short is a very slow physical mechanism and
consideration of both individual cell capacity and the level of current
necessary for heating lead us to conclude that sUch an internal short must
take place over a period of roughly 100-200 hours to generate heat fast enough
to create an OVERTEMPERATURE condition. For the Storage Fault Tree the Seal
Failure basic event probability has also been multiplied by 168 instead of 720
hours.
7.0 USE OF THE FAULT TREE
Two points must be emphasized at the outset of this discussion: A)
we have assumed that Failure of the battery module initiated by the explosion
of a single cell is equivalent to damage to the spacecraft; B) the main
usefulness of the fault trees and the purpose for which they are most valuable
is determining the relative importance of the various branches of the fault
tree and the sensitivity of the Top Event occurrence frequency to significant
changes in any of the basic event probabilities. The fault tree will show
which factors are most important to be improved or closely controlled in order
to make the Top Event frequency as low as possible within the limits of
practicality.
The "hardness" or absolute accuracy in many of the probabilities
presented in Figures 10-13 can be argued at some length. Thus, instead of
taking a given Top Event probability as a gospel value it is better to state
that if we relax stringent limits on quality control and don't do a good job
in the battery module design, our Top Event hazard probability may be as great
as 10-2 for the mission; while, conversely, if we do the best possible job of
quality control on components, and cells and do a good job on the module
design, our Top Event hazard probability may be as low as 10 -6 per module,
essentially that for explosion for unexplained reasons.
Likewise, the probability for an undetected Single Cell Venting
(Figure II) during one month's Storage/Integration is reduced from 3.43 x 10 -2
to 8.63 x 10 -5 per module by the use of an on-site SO 2 detector during
integration. The probability of a single ceil venting is calculated from
Figure 13 with the basic event Cell Vent Stuck or Slow probability set equal
to one (the cell vents as it is supposed to; no explosion occurs9 but gases
are released from the battery module).
8.0 CONCLUSIONS
The analysis has shown that with the right combination of blocking
diodes, electrical fuses, thermal fuses, thermal switches, cell balance, cell
vents and battery module vents the probability of a single cell or a 72-celi
module exploding can be reduced to I0 -u, essentially the probability due to
explosion for unexplained reasons. This one chance in a million value for the
module is quite conservative since we have assumed (see Figure i0) that if a
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single cell explodes, then one or more additional cells will also explode in a
sympathetic secondary reaction even though the module vents
operatenominally. This certainty of an uncontrollable secondary explosion
seems to us to be the only reasonable assumption based on the present dearth
of data for battery modules of the present design and for cells of Li/SOCI 2
chemistry.
For one month of integration an4 test of the spacecraft on the ground
the probability of module failure is i0-° (Figure ii) as stated above. Of
equal importance we have considered the possibility o_ a cell venting (the
cell vent operates correctly in Figure 13 and the i0-_ probability of the cell
vent being stuck or slow is replaced by 0.99999) and releasing toxic gases
that may injure personnel. The probability of a cell venting has been
calculated as 3.43 x 10-2 in Figure 13. We can reduce the probability of
personnel exposure by the use of a sulfur dioxide monitor in line with the
module vent manifold. An audible alarm will be triggered whenever the
concentration of SO2 exceeds I ppm in the manifold. The left side of Figure
ii shows that this reduces the probability of an undetected toxic gas release
to 8.63 x 10 -5 per battery module or about 7 x 10-4 for the complete
spacecraft battery.
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Figure ] O.
Battery module safety fault tree for spacecraft.
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Figure l l. Battery module safety fault trees for ground integration.
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Figure 12. LiSOCI 2 single cell safety fault tree for spacecraft.
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Figure 13. LiSOCI 2 single cell safety fault tree for storage of 1 month.
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